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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the role that macroeconomic uncertainty plays in 
banks’ decisions on the optimal asset allocation. Following the portfolio 
model proposed by Baum et al. (2005), the paper aims at disentangling 
how Italian banks choose between loans and risk-free assets when 
uncertainty on macroeconomic conditions increases.  
The econometric results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty is a 
significant determinant of banks’ investment decisions, also after 
controlling for other factors. In periods of increasing turmoil, banks’ 
ability to accurately forecast future returns is hindered and herding 
behaviour tends to emerge, as witnessed by the reduction of the cross-
sectional variance of the share of loans held in portfolio. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, the increasing interest in financial stability as an autonomous 
policy target, along with monetary and microeconomic stability, has encouraged the 
analyses of the linkages between the macroeconomic environment and the soundness of 
the banking system.  
This stream of work is usually referred to as research on the “procyclicality” of 
banks’ operations. Most of these studies use the current status of macroeconomic 
conditions as the main exogenous cause for the state of health of banks. The goal is to 
assess to what extent macroeconomy affects banks’ performance (cyclicality) and 
whether, in turn, banks’ reaction to changing macroeconomic conditions further affects 
the macroeconomy, reinforcing cyclical fluctuations (procyclicality). These studies 
generally confirm that banks’ balance sheets are affected, simultaneously or with some 
delay, by the business cycle and claim that banks’ behaviour is procyclical. 
However, the change in banks’ behaviour through the business cycle is not 
explicitly modelled, but it is simply inferred looking at the reduced-form relationships 
between micro and macro variables. Bank-specific indicators are frequently included as 
regressors, but they are only used as control variables, while the focus rests on the 
proxies for macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, apart from some recent papers on 
North-American banks, no study assesses the role that macroeconomic uncertainty 
plays in determining banks’ behaviour: in other words, no attention is paid on the 
second moments of macroeconomic variables. 
Summing up, the current state of the art is unsatisfactory for two main reasons: 
i) no attempt is made in order to model how banks’ management varies in changing 
Page 2 of 37
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 2
macroeconomic environments; ii) the effect of the uncertainty regarding future 
macroeconomic conditions is typically neglected.   
This paper tries to fill these gaps. In particular, it aims at disentangling which 
are the determinants of banks’ willingness to invest in risky loans as opposed to risk-
free assets and understanding whether macroeconomic uncertainty plays a role in this 
choice. Following the portfolio model proposed by Baum et al. (2005), which provides 
an explicit link between the cross-bank dispersion of the share of loans held in portfolio 
and uncertainty, the paper discusses how Italian banks choose between loans and risk-
free assets when the uncertainty of macroeconomic conditions increases. Given the 
substantial differences between North-American and European banking sectors, this 
paper can provide useful insights on the reliability of the model when a different sample 
of intermediaries is used. 
An important innovation of this work is that, with respect to Baum et al., who 
neglect the role of idiosyncratic factors in the econometric specification, the impact of 
macroeconomic uncertainty is assessed after controlling for bank-specific sources of 
uncertainty. In particular, introducing an appropriate proxy, I explicitly consider the 
importance of idiosyncratic uncertainty in determining banks’ portfolio decisions. 
This paper also enriches the existing evidence employing different proxies for 
macroeconomic uncertainty; this also allows me to extensively assess the robustness of 
the results. Finally, the paper provides evidence on banks’ sub-samples, testing whether 
the theory is valid at different levels of aggregation.  
The econometric results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty plays a 
significant role in Italian banks’ investment decisions. In periods of increasing turmoil, 
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banks receive noisier signals on the expected returns of loans and, therefore, tend to 
behave more homogenously, as shown by the reduction of the loan-to-asset ratio cross-
sectional dispersion. Idiosyncratic uncertainty is also relevant and its coefficient takes 
on a positive sign. When returns on specific investments are less easily predictable, 
better informed banks can exploit their competitive advantage and behave in a different 
way with respect to poorly informed intermediaries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide a 
short survey of the literature and describe the portfolio model used in the analysis. 
Section 4  reports the empirical results. Conclusions are provided in Section 5. 
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There is a huge literature supporting the hypothesis that macroeconomic 
conditions affect the performance of the banking sector1. Most of the work focuses on 
measures of central tendency rather than on those of uncertainty. 
Salas and Saurina (2002), for instance, observe that macroeconomic shocks are 
quickly transmitted to Spanish banks’ balance sheets. During economic booms, 
intermediaries tend to expand their lending activity, often relaxing their selection 
criteria; in the following downturns, bad loans remarkably increase, producing losses. 
Using a panel of Italian banks, Quagliariello (in press, b) finds that loan loss provisions 
and bad debts increase in bad macroeconomic times. Pesola (2001) shows that the high 
level of both corporate and households’ indebtedness, along with shortfalls of GDP 
growth below forecast levels, contributed to the banking crises in the Nordic countries. 
Similar evidence is provided in cross-country comparisons by Bikker and Hu (2002), 
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Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Valckx (2003). Gambera (2000) and Meyer and Yeager 
(2001) document that a small number of macroeconomic variables are good predictors 
for non-performing loan ratio in the US. Similarly, Hoggarth et al. (2005) provide 
evidence of a clear link between the state of the UK business cycle and banks’ write-
offs. 
While there is an extensive literature on the investment decisions of non-
financial firms under macroeconomic instability (for a survey, see Carruth et al. 
(2000)), the role of uncertainty regarding future macroeconomic conditions has been 
largely neglected for banks instead. This is an important issue, since banks’ investments 
fuel those of the rest of the economy. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two 
recent papers that investigated this issue. 
Baum et al. (2005) use a portfolio model and a sample of US banks. Their 
results suggest that when macroeconomic uncertainty – proxied by the conditional 
variance of a relevant macroeconomic variable – increases, the cross-bank dispersion of 
the share of risky loans to total assets diminishes, as uncertainty hinders bank ability to 
foresee investment opportunities. In other words, they claim that higher uncertainty 
makes the signals on expected returns noisier. Uncertainty would therefore push banks 
to rebalance the composition of their assets according to new (worse) signals provided 
by credit markets, adversely affecting the allocation of financial resources. This fosters 
herding behaviour and leads banks to behave more homogeneously than in quiet 
periods. This evidence is robust to the inclusion of several control variables and holds 
for total bank loans as well as for their main components. 
                                                                                                                                               
1 For a survey, see Quagliariello (in press, a). 
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Adopting the same approach, Garcia and Calmes (2005) reach similar 
conclusions for the Canadian banking system. Their results, though based on univariate 
regression, confirm that there is a negative relationship between the proxy for 
macroeconomic uncertainty and the cross-bank variance of the loan-to-asset ratio. In 
other words, also Canadian intermediaries show herding behaviour when they deal with 
more pronounced aggregate uncertainty.  
3. BANKS’ LENDING DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: BAUM, CAGLAYAN AND OZKAN’S 
MODEL 
Adapting the framework for non-financial firms’ investments presented by 
Beaudry et al. (2001), Baum et al. (2005) propose a model that describes how banks set 
the optimal composition of their portfolios.  
In their scheme, banks’ managers operate in a risky environment and, in each 
period, can invest deposits into two different assets: loans and bonds. The investment in 
bonds is assumed free of default risk, but it bears market risk since the value of the 
securities may change as a result of varying market conditions. This risk is predictable 
and, more importantly, it can be managed and hedged. The return of such an investment 
is the risk free rate (rf).  
Loans to customers entail the exposure to both market and default risk. The 
latter is the result of an idiosyncratic component – due the probability that the specific 
customer will default in the future without repaying the debt – and systemic factors, 
correlated to the status of the economy. In fact, it is well documented that in bad 
macroeconomic times the riskiness of bank portfolios tends to increase.  
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For bank i at time t, the investment in risky loans provides a stochastic return (ri) 
equal to the risk free rate plus a risk premium (rpi), which is equal for all loans – 
assumed to be homogeneous – and does not depend on the riskiness of the single 
borrower2: 
ifi rprr +=       (1) 
The risk premium has an expected value E(rpi)=ρ and a variance Var(rpi)=σ2ε.  
The return on loans can thus be expressed as: 
ifi rr ερ ++= ,     (2) 
where εi is a random component distributed as N(0, σ2ε). Baum et al. also 
assume that each bank has a specific portfolio with different riskiness structure and, 
hence, the random components of return across different intermediaries are not 
correlated (E[εiεj]=0). 
Banks’ managers deal with a portfolio optimization problem. They rebalance the 
composition of their assets in order to obtain the preferred combination of risk and 
expected return. According to their utility functions, they choose the shares αi and (1-
αi) of their assets to invest respectively in loans and bonds. However, before taking the 
decision, banks observe neither the actual risk premium nor the random component εi, 
but only a noisy signal of them: 
νε += iiS ,      (3)  
                                                 
2 The subscript t is omitted since the model describes a one period problem. 
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where ν  is a random variable independent of εi with a normal distribution N(0, 
σ2ν). By assumption, the noise component (ν) of the signal banks receive is identical for 
all of them, while the overall signals remain different across intermediaries because of 
εi. In fact, even though all banks are believed to have the ability to overcome 
asymmetric information problems, cross-sectional differences in their private 
information set remain. In principle, ν may be observed and uncertainty eliminated if all 
banks would share their private information. However, information sharing is unlikely 
to hold in the credit market.  
The noise ν can be interpreted as the degree of uncertainty on future 
macroeconomic conditions. Its impact on banks is homogeneous, regardless of 
managers’ ability to predict the random component of loan return εi. When 
macroeconomic uncertainty increases, the higher variance of ν makes the estimates of 
the true return of loans less precise. The assumption of independence between ν and εi 
is now clearer; indeed, it is plausible that the aggregate macroeconomic shock is not 
correlated with the idiosyncratic component of loan returns.  
In order to determine the expected return on loans (ri), bank managers have to 
predict the value of εi. Without observing the noisy signal, banks’ unconditional 
forecast on εi would be the mean of its distribution, i.e. zero. However, banks do 
observe the signal and can extract additional information from it. The expected value of 
the return from loans conditional upon Si, E[εi|Si], is assumed to be a constant 
proportion (λ) of the signal, where λ represents a linear regression coefficient of εi on 
Si: 
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)(]|[ νελλε +== iiii SSE , where 22
2
νε
ε
σσ
σλ +=   (4) 
The conditional expected return of the i-th bank’s portfolio E[Ri|Si] is therefore: 
fiifi
fiiifiii
rr
rSErSRE
)1())((
)1(])|[(]|[
ανελρα
αερα
−++++
=−+++=
  (5) 
and the conditional variance Var[Ri|Si] is: 
22]|[ νλσα iii SRVar =       (6) 
Risk-averse banks are assumed to have the following utility function: 
]|[
2
]|[]|[ iiiiii SRVarSRESUE
ω−= ,   (7)  
which is increasing in expected return and decreasing in return volatility (and ω 
is the coefficient of risk aversion).  
Employing the portfolio’s mean/variance equations, it is straightforward to 
derive the optimal loan-to-asset ratio (αi) for bank i and the associated cross-sectional 
dispersion: 
2
νωλσ
λρα ii S+=         (8) 
42
2
)(
ν
ε
σω
σα =iVar       (9) 
The variance of the cross-sectional distribution of the loan-to-asset ratio is 
negatively correlated to the level of macroeconomic uncertainty σ2ν. Indeed, taking the 
first derivative of the variance of αi with respect to σ2ν, it derives: 
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02)( 62
2
2 <−=∂
∂
ν
ε
ν σω
σ
σ
α iVar ,     (10) 
which provides a testable implication of the hypothesis that the cross-sectional 
variance of the loan-to-asset ratio narrows as macroeconomic uncertainty increases.  
The variance of αi instead widens when the variance of the idiosyncratic 
component increases: 
01)( 422 >=∂
∂
νε σωσ
α iVar      (11) 
 Therefore, it is essential to control for this component when testing for the 
impact of macroeconomic uncertainty. The choice of a proper proxy for idiosyncratic 
risk may however represent a major problem. 
In sum, I have two hypotheses to test: 
Hypothesis 1): When macroeconomic uncertainty increases, banks tend to 
allocate assets in their portfolios more homogeneously (the variance of α across banks 
reduces); 
Hypothesis 2): When idiosyncratic uncertainty increases, banks tend to behave 
more heterogeneously (the variance of α across banks rises). 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.1 Data 
The impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on banks’ lending decisions can be 
empirically tested using the following specification: 
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ttttit ucbaLTAVar +++= 2,2,, )( εν σσ ,   (a) 
where LTAi,t is the loan-to-asset ratio and Vart(LTAi,t) is its cross-sectional 
variance at time t; σ2ν represents macroeconomic uncertainty evaluated at time t; σ2ε is 
the idiosyncratic uncertainty and ut is the error term. 
The cross-bank variance of the LTA is built up using quarterly data (1990q1-
2005q1) for a sample of more than 900 intermediaries, representing virtually the entire 
Italian banking system in each quarter. Before 1990 the Italian credit market was 
intensely regulated by public authorities for both monetary policy and supervisory 
purposes3. The results of the analysis would be therefore not reliable. Furthermore, 
formal Chow tests reject at the 1 per cent level the null hypothesis of no structural break 
in 1990 and advice to split the sample. 
Overall, the dataset includes 58.146 bank/quarter observations. A summary of 
the characteristics of the sample is provided in table 1.  
                                                 
3 For example, as far as monetary policy is concerned, in 1986q1-1986q2 and 1987q4-1988q1 ceilings 
on the supply of credit that each bank may provide to the aggregate of its customers (so-called 
massimale sugli impieghi) were still in use. These constraints, intended for controlling liquidity and 
aggregate demand, limited banks’ ability to expand their shares in the loan market. As a result, even in 
the absence of specific obligations for banks to subscribe Treasury bonds, the banking system’s 
demand for bonds increased (see Cotula, 1989). Also supervisory rules were particularly strict. 
According to the banking law, intermediaries were classified as retail banks, providing only short-term 
credit, and medium and long-term credit institutions. Until 1990, when the Bank of Italy decided to 
liberalize banks’ branch networks, the opening of new branches was limited by the system of “branch 
plans”. These legal barriers between different categories of banks and the administrative constraints on 
the opening of branches were an obstacle to the enlargement of banks’ activity (see Ciocca, 2004). 
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[Insert table 1 here] 
Accounting ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the statistics 
that intermediaries are required to report to the Bank of Italy; the macroeconomic 
variables are drawn from the OECD main economic indicators (MEI) dataset.  
The evolution of the loan-to-asset ratio over time is drawn in figure 1. The ratio 
shows a clear ascending trend, witnessing the increasing liberalization of the Italian 
credit market and the competitive incentives to improve market positions that banks 
received during the ‘90s. Also, the gradual reduction of interest rates made the 
subscription of securities, especially government bonds, less profitable for banks. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
Given the relevance of this trend, I estimate model (a) using the coefficient of 
variation rather than the variance of the LTA in order to have a unit-free measure of 
dispersion: 
ttttit ucbaLTACV +++= 2,2,, )( εν σσ    (b) 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics for the loan-to-asset ratio (LTA), 
its variance (STDLTA) and coefficient of variation (CVLTA). Data refer to the whole 
banking system as well as to 5 dimensional breakdowns4.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
                                                 
4 According to the classifications provided by the Bank of Italy, banks are grouped into five categories 
depending on the size of their total assets: major banks (total assets greater than 45 billion euros), large 
(total assets between 20 and 45 billion euros), medium-sized (7-20), small (1-7), minor (total assets up 
to 1 billion euros). 
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Looking at the table, there is no evidence of a clear relationship between LTA 
dispersion and bank size during the fifteen years under observation. Fig. 2 provides a 
clearer picture of this relationship. 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
Large banks are those that, in the period under examination, have the smaller 
cross-sectional dispersion of the indicator. By contrast, small banks are those that 
behave more heterogeneously. However, in the last two years, major and large banks 
show the highest levels of the variation coefficients. This may indicate that recently 
large banks have adopted more diversified growth strategies. 
Certainly, the evolution of LTA is also affected by the consolidation process of 
the Italian banking system. Indeed, after M&As, the newly established banking groups 
tended to reorganize their portfolios and, in some cases, to allocate specific assets to 
specialized entities of the group. This is particularly evident for major banks in 1995 
and 1998.  
4.2 Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty 
There are several ways to measure macroeconomic uncertainty. According to 
Driver et al. (2004) and Sepulveda-Umanzor (2004) two approaches are dominant: the 
“survey based approach” (or cross-section dispersion forecasts) and the “model based 
approach” (or time series conditional volatility).  
The first one exploits the surveys on the expectations on relevant 
macroeconomic variables and obtains a measure of uncertainty as the intra-personal 
dispersion of the expectations. A main shortcoming of this methodology is that the 
intra-personal dispersion (i.e., the true uncertainty) is not observable and may only be 
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approximated using the inter-personal dispersion of the expectations (the disagreement 
across forecasters). This procedure is reliable only if the latter measure is a valid proxy 
for the former (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Bomberger, 1996). In fact, it is possible 
that, even if each forecaster is extremely uncertain about future events, all of them 
submit similar estimates. Then, this measure would fail to capture the amount of 
existing uncertainty (Grier and Perry, 2000).  
The second metric is obtained employing the realised values of the 
macroeconomic variables in order to get statistical or econometric estimations of their 
variability. Even though many measures of uncertainty can be implemented from time-
series (unconditional variance, one-step ahead forecast errors, etc.), the conditional 
heteroskedasticity estimated with G(ARCH) models is one of the most widely used 
(Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986). In the case of GARCH(1,1), the conditional variance of 
a variable (ht) can be estimated, along with its mean, using the following specification: 
ttt xy ηβ +=  
1
2
1 −− ++= ttt ghach η  
Provided that the coefficients on the ARCH and GARCH effects are statistically 
significant, the fitted values of ht can be employed as proxies for uncertainty. This 
approach has two potential drawbacks. First, as highlighted by Sepulveda-Umanzor 
(2004), “rather than measuring uncertainty, the model based approach really measures 
volatility. The former is a feature that forward looking agents face when confronting 
any decision, the latter is a characteristic of the data once uncertainty has been solved”. 
Second, the time-series used in the analyses do not necessarily exhibit (G)ARCH 
processes. 
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Given the complexity of defining reliable proxies for uncertainty, ideally one 
would use both the approaches recalled above. However, due to lack of data on survey 
outputs, in this paper I use the latter and calculate the conditional heteroskedasticity of 
relevant macroeconomic variables as proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty5. In spite 
of some of its shortcomings, this approach is commonly used in the literature. As a 
robustness check, I also use the one-step ahead forecast error as an alternative metric. 
I use the OECD monthly series of the composite leading indicator, industrial 
production and consumer price index (CPI). The time span of the series is 1975m1-
2005m3. The composite leading indicator is an aggregate series that shows a leading 
relationship with the reference series for the business cycle in a given country; the 
indicator can therefore be used as an early signal of the main turning points of the 
aggregate economic activity. The industrial production index measures the increases 
and decreases in production output. Given the impact that fluctuations in the level of 
industrial activity have on the remainder of the economy, the variable is frequently used 
as a short-term indicator of the business cycle. The indicator is seasonally adjusted. 
As pointed out by Carruth et al. (2000), often the literature that uses conditional 
variance as a measure of uncertainty assumes, rather than testing, both the stationarity 
of the time-series and the presence of (G)ARCH effects. In this paper, the original 
monthly series are transformed in order to obtain the monthly percentage rates of 
change of industrial production (INDPRODC), CPI (INFL) and the leading indicator 
(LEADINDC). The transformation allows to work with stationary series (table 3) and 
                                                 
5 For Italy, a quarterly survey on firms’ expectations regarding future inflation is available only since 
December 1999. 
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consistently estimate their conditional variance. For each variable, the specification of 
the auxiliary regression employed for the ADF tests has been selected via a general to-
simple-approach, as suggested by Enders (1995), starting with 6 lags, a trend and a 
constant.  
 [Insert table 3 here] 
The results of the Lagrange Multiplier tests for null hypothesis of no ARCH 
effects suggest that both industrial production growth and CPI inflation exhibit 
significant conditional heteroskedasticity; for the series of the composite leading 
indicator, the test is not significant instead (table 4). Accordingly, I exclude the latter 
variable from the analysis and estimate the GARCH models only for the former two 
variables. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
Table 5a and 5b provide the results of the unrestricted GARCH(1,1) models 
performed on industrial production growth (INDPRODC) and inflation (INFL). In the 
variance equation, the coefficients of the ARCH and GARCH effects are significant 
respectively at the 5 and 1 per cent levels for both the variables.  
[Insert tables 5a, 5b here] 
The conditional variance (ht) derived from each GARCH model is finally averaged 
to quarterly frequency in order to obtain the measure of macroeconomic uncertainty 
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(INDPRVA and INFLVA)6.  
These variables enter in model (b) as generated regressors. They measure with 
noise the true, though unobservable, regressor ( 2νσ ). The estimates for model (b) can 
therefore be biased and inconsistent if the ARCH-type model employed is misspecified. 
Therefore, I use the Lagrange Multiplier in order to test for neglected serial 
correlation of up to order 12 in the standardized squared residuals of the ARCH models. 
The LM tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no additional ARCH effects at any 
conventional level. These results confirm that the specification is able to capture all the 
conditional heteroskedasticity present in industrial production and inflation series and 
corroborate the choice of the parsimonious GARCH (1,1). The correct specification of 
the generating regressions should ensure parameter consistency also in the derived 
model (Pagan and Ullah, 1988).  
Figures 3 and 4 plot the coefficient of variation of the loan-to-asset ratio and the 
measures of industrial production and inflation uncertainty respectively.  
[Insert figures 3, 4 here] 
In the aftermath of the EMS crisis in the first half of the ‘90s, the coefficient of 
variation of the LTA ratio reaches the lowest figure. In the same period, macroeconomic 
– especially inflation – uncertainty rises markedly. 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking this measure is not the quarterly volatility, but the average of the monthly volatilities 
in a given quarter. As an alternative measure I also use the quarter-end conditional variance. Results 
are unchanged. 
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The dispersion of the LTA shows a significant increase during the second half of 
the decade, a period characterized by the vigorous process of consolidation, which 
encouraged banks to look for new markets and more profitable activities. This may help 
explain more heterogeneous behaviour across intermediaries. Both measures of 
economic uncertainty show a descending trend during the ‘90s; for inflation, this 
tendency is particularly noticeable at the end of those years. This is likely one of the 
benefits of the EMU convergence process.  
4.3 Econometric specification and results 
The final specification of model (b) is the following: 
ttt
ttttit
uSHARECfINDPRODCe
INFLdSTDNPLchbaLTACV
+++
++++= +1, )(   (c)  
where ht is the estimated conditional variance of either industrial production 
growth (INDPRVA) or inflation (INFLVA). According to hypothesis 1), the expected 
sign of the coefficient of this regressor is negative. Along with the proxy for 
macroeconomic uncertainty (ht), I also introduce some control variables.  
First, I employ the 1-quarter lead of the cross-sectional variance of the non-
performing loan ratio (STDNPL). This indicator is a proxy for the idiosyncratic 
uncertainty. If at time t the idiosyncratic uncertainty (εi) increases allowing “good” 
banks to correctly predict the expected return/risk of different investments, in the 
following periods the riskiness of those banks should be significantly lower than that of 
poorly informed intermediaries. Therefore, the variance of the non-performing loans 
ratio across intermediaries should widen. Of course, the NPL ratio is also affected by 
systemic factors; however, its cross-sectional dispersion may still provide some useful 
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insight regarding hypothesis 2). The expected sign of this variable is positive. Since the 
variable may be endogenous, in the estimation it is instrumented with the lagged value 
of STDNPL. 
Second, I use the first moment of inflation (INFL) and industrial production 
growth (INDPRODC) in order to control for the overall macroeconomic conditions and 
to test the robustness of the results in the presence of the levels of the variables 
(Huizinga, 1993). Inflation is frequently found as an indicator of macroeconomic 
mismanagement; high inflation may therefore, per se, imply uncertainty on the future. A 
negative coefficient is therefore my a priori belief. By contrast, it is not immediately 
clear the impact of industrial production growth on the dependent variable. Indeed, it is 
difficult to say whether in good times banks tend to behave more or less 
homogeneously.   
Lastly, I introduce a variable (SHAREC) aiming at assessing the impact of the 
conditions on financial markets, since this is another factor that may influence banks’ 
decisions. This variable is the quarterly rate of change of the “all shares” index 
calculated by the OECD from daily closing quotations.  
Tables 6, 7 and 8 summarize the variables used in the estimations, show the 
main descriptive statistics of the regressors and illustrate the pair-wise correlations 
between the variables. It is interesting to note that the correlations between the 
dispersion of the loan-to-asset ratio – both in terms of variance and coefficient of 
variation – and uncertainty measures are negative and statistically significant at the 5 
per cent level. 
[Insert tables 6, 7, 8 here] 
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Table 9 presents the instrumental-variable regression results. Newey-West 
standard errors are calculated assuming an autocorrelation up to the order 4. 
[Insert table 9 here] 
In both the specification, the proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty show the 
expected negative sign and are statistically significant, although their economic 
relevance is different. In particular, the magnitude of the coefficient on INFLVA (-1.23) 
suggests that this variable is an important determinant of LTA dispersion.  
Overall, this confirms that Italian banks behave more homogenously when the 
perspectives of the economy are unclear. This is consistent with the evidence regarding 
US and Canadian banks reported respectively by Baum et al. (2004) and Garcia and 
Calmes (2005) and with the results of Beaudry et al. (2001) for UK non-financial firms. 
However, it is worth pointing out that, with aggregate data, no inference can be 
drawn on the allocation of funds to particular loans and hence the credit risk of the loan 
book. In other words, the model implicitly assumes that bank’s loan portfolio is 
homogenous. These assumptions should be ideally tested providing results for several 
loan categories, along with the aggregate ones7. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, 
this is not feasible at this stage.  
The proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty is also statistically significant and takes 
on a positive sign. When the returns on specific investments are less easily predictable, 
better informed banks can exploit their competitive advantage and behave in a different 
way with respect to poorly informed intermediaries. 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to the referee for raising this point. 
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In sum, results confirm that systemic uncertainty, both on the real and the 
financial side of the economy, induces intermediaries to herding behaviour. In contrast, 
individual uncertainty leads banks to behave more heterogeneously when deciding the 
allocation of their assets.  
As far as the other control variables are concerned, industrial production growth 
is never significant. The inclusion of different variables aiming at controlling for the 
evolution of the business cycle, such as the leading indicator, demand and consumption 
growth or changes in the interest rates, does not change this evidence. This result 
indicates that the level of aggregate economic activity does not have any impact on the 
cross-sectional variability of the share that banks decide to invest in risky loans. 
However, the significance of the control variables must be interpreted with caution 
since the proxy for uncertainty is a generated regressor and the coefficient on it is 
significantly different from zero (Pagan, 1984; Oxley and McAleer, 1993).  
The coefficient on inflation is not significant as well. The changes of the stock 
exchange index are slightly significant in the model with industrial production 
uncertainty. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
4.4.1 Size breakdowns 
The dataset with banks’ size breakdowns is used for robustness checks. The 
model is estimated using panel data techniques that exploit the cross-sectional 
dimension and allow obtaining more robust results8. For the estimation, I can exploit 
                                                 
8 In principle, if bank’s size is a proxy for the type of loans a bank grants, the evidence provided in this 
section might partly overcome the shortcomings related to loan heterogeneity mentioned above. 
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300 observations (60 quarters / 5 size breakdowns). The results of the random effect 
model are presented in table 10. 
[Insert table 10 here] 
They appear consistent with those obtained in the previous paragraph. 
Macroeconomic uncertainty has a significant negative impact on the cross-bank 
dispersion of the loan-to-asset ratio, while the proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty shows 
a positive sign. In these specifications, industrial production growth is significant, 
though at the 10 per cent level, and takes on a negative sign. According to this evidence, 
banks would take more uniform portfolio decisions during expansions. Inflation remains 
not significant, contrasting the idea that higher inflation levels are perceived as signals 
of economic turmoil. The Hausman tests for both the regressions imply that the random 
effects are appropriate for this sample.  
4.4.2 Uncertainty based on the one-step ahead forecast error 
In this paragraph, I use a different proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty in order 
to check whether my previous results are robust to different measures. The metric 
proposed here is based on the 1-step ahead forecast errors of the autoregressive models 
of industrial production growth and inflation. As suggested by Serven (1998), to ensure 
that the predictions use no more information than that available at the time they are 
formulated, they are computed from recursive estimation of the autoregressions. 
Therefore, for each variable, I estimate recursively the following auto-regressive model 
of order 2: 
                                                                                                                                               
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case, since Italian banks are not specialized according to their 
size. 
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tttt yyy υβββ +++= −− 22110  
The initial length of the series is set at 50. Since the dataset contains 362 
observations (quarters) and I introduce 2 lags, I estimate 310 (362-2-50) regressions, in 
order to compute the 1-step ahead forecast errors. Using the recursive parameter 
estimates, I finally obtain the alternative uncertainty measure as the quarterly mean 
absolute values of the monthly one-step ahead forecast errors for industrial production 
and inflation (respectively INDPRODFE and INFLFE).  
Table 11 provides the results of the regression of LTA variation coefficient on 
INDPRODFE and INFLFE.   
[Insert table 11 here] 
The role of uncertainty is confirmed by this exercise. Both additional proxies for 
macroeconomic uncertainty are statistically significant and negative. In particular, 
inflation unpredictability seems to be the most relevant determinant of banks’ herding 
behaviours. Idiosyncratic uncertainty remains significantly positive. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper tries to disentangle which are the determinants of banks’ decisions 
regarding the allocation of their portfolios; in particular it aims at assessing whether 
macroeconomic uncertainty plays a role in this choice. Following the portfolio model 
proposed by Baum et al., I discuss how Italian banks choose between loans and risk-
free assets when the uncertainty on macroeconomic conditions increases. With respect 
to previous work, which neglects the role of idiosyncratic factors, the impact of 
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macroeconomic uncertainty is assessed, taking also into account bank-specific sources 
of uncertainty.  
The econometric results confirm that macroeconomic uncertainty does have a 
role in Italian banks’ investment decisions. In periods of increasing turmoil, banks 
receive noisier signals on the expected returns of loans and, therefore, tend to behave 
more homogeneously, as shown by the reduction of the cross-sectional dispersion of the 
loan-to-asset ratio. A plausible corollary is that the allocation of bank credit becomes 
less efficient. Idiosyncratic uncertainty is also relevant and its coefficient takes on a 
positive sign. When the returns on specific investments are less easily predictable, 
better informed banks can exploit their competitive advantage and behave in a different 
way with respect to poorly informed intermediaries. These results are generally 
confirmed when bank size breakdowns are employed in the estimation. Furthermore, 
they are robust to the inclusion of several control variables and the use of different 
measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Macroeconomic uncertainty is therefore an important determinant of banks’ 
lending decisions and a cause of potential disturbances in financial resource allocation. 
Since bank loans are a relevant source of financing for the non-financial sector, central 
banks and supervisory authorities should monitor the degree of uncertainty on the 
evolution of the main economic aggregates in order to strengthen macroeconomic and 
financial stability. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1
no. banks per quarter 
(average) no. obs
FULL SAMPLE 953 58146
MAJOR BANKS 14 870
LARGE BANKS 16 972
MEDIUM BANKS 36 2203
SMALL BANKS 143 8740
MINOR BANKS 744 45361
TIME-SPAN
THE SAMPLES: SUMMARY
1st quarter 1990 - 1st quarter 2005
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Table 2
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max
LTA 61 44.81 6.68 36.23 58.10
STDLTA 61 15.81 3.91 10.51 21.52
CVLTA 61 0.35 0.04 0.27 0.40
LTA 61 44.16 4.33 32.95 51.58
STDLTA 61 13.12 8.56 4.00 28.47
CVLTA 61 0.29 0.18 0.09 0.62
LTA 61 46.57 3.27 39.38 53.89
STDLTA 61 14.39 6.98 4.67 28.26
CVLTA 61 0.31 0.14 0.10 0.63
LTA 61 50.00 7.27 37.79 62.92
STDLTA 61 16.53 4.18 7.56 22.01
CVLTA 61 0.33 0.06 0.17 0.45
LTA 61 48.28 7.82 36.87 62.90
STDLTA 61 19.00 5.13 10.55 24.43
CVLTA 61 0.39 0.07 0.26 0.51
LTA 61 43.86 6.51 35.86 57.34
STDLTA 61 14.85 3.62 10.33 20.68
CVLTA 61 0.33 0.04 0.27 0.40
Medium Banks
Small Banks
Minor Banks
LOAN-TO-ASSET RATIO: SIZE BREAKDOWN
Major Banks
Large Banks
TOTAL
Notes: LTA is the average of the loan-to-asset ratio; STDLTA is the cross-sectional variance
of the loan-to-asset-ratio; CVLTA is the cross-sectional coefficient of variation of the loan-to-
asset-ratio.
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Table 3
Variable Z(t) statistics
1% critical value 5% critical value 10% critical value
INDPRODC (2) -6.512*** -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
INFL (3) -4.532*** -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
LEADINDC (4) -5.657*** -2.58 -1.95 -1.62
ADF TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS (1)
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Augmented Dickey Fuller test for unit root. Selection of the auxiliary regression via general-to-simple
procedure. (2) 5 lags and drift included in the regression. (3) 5 lags, trend and drift included in the regression. 
(4) 5 lags included in the regression.
 
 
 
 
Table 4
Variable
Chi-squared df Chi-squared df
INDPRODC 14.206*** 1 24.606*** 4
INFL 3.833** 1 52.922*** 4
LEADINDC 0.005 1 6.928 4
LM TEST FOR ARCH EFFECTS (1)
ARCH(1) ARCH(4)
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects. 4 lags included in the auxiliary autoregression.
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Table 5a
Coefficient Semi-robust SE Sign. lev.
Mean equation
INDPRODC (LAG1) -0.2152 0.0602 ***
CONSTANT 0.0793 0.0639
Variance equation
ARCH(1) 0.0462 0.0187 **
GARCH(1) 0.9449 0.0158 ***
CONSTANT 0.0012 0.0067
Nr. Obs.
Wald Chi-squared ***
Log pseudo-likelihood
LM ARCH 1-12 F(12,332)=  0.37746
-630,765
 ESTIMATION OF MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY
GARCH (1,1) FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GROWTH
361
Chi2(1)=12.78
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects is reported.
 
Table 5b
Coefficient Semi-robust SE Sign. lev.
Mean equation
INFL (LAG1) 0.2901 0.0561 ***
INFL (LAG2) 0.0858 0.0576
INFL (LAG3) 0.2054 0.0563 ***
INFL (LAG4) 0.1478 0.0549 ***
INFL (LAG5) 0.0218 0.0522
INFL (LAG6) 0.1103 0.0570 *
CONSTANT 0.0429 0.0170 **
Variance equation
ARCH(1) 0.1156 0.5584 **
GARCH(1) 0.8815 0.0433 ***
CONSTANT 0.0004 0.0004
Nr. Obs.
Wald Chi-squared ***
Log pseudo-likelihood
LM ARCH 1-12 F(12,322)=   1.4037
-29.64749
 ESTIMATION OF MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY
GARCH (1,1) FOR CPI INFLATION
356
Chi2(6)=323.34
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects is reported.  
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Table 6
Name Description Source
LTA Loan-to-asset ratio (%) BoI Sup.statistics
STDLTA Cross-sectional STD of LTA (%) BoI Sup.statistics
CVLTA Coefficient of variation of LTA (STDLTA/MLTA) BoI Sup.statistics
STDNPL Cross-sectional STD of non-performing loan ratio (%) BoI Sup.statistics
INDPRODC Industrial production change (%) OECD
INFL CPI inflation (%) OECD
SHAREC Share price change (%) OECD
INDPRVA Conditional variance of INDPRODC OECD
INFLVA Conditional variance of INFL OECD
SELECTED VARIABLES
 
 
Table 7
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max
STDNPL 61 9.24 0.93 7.60 11.26
INDPRODC 61 0.04 0.53 -1.18 1.19
INFL 61 0.28 0.16 0.03 0.69
SHAREC 61 0.60 3.80 -8.15 11.67
INDPRVA 61 0.86 0.37 0.41 2.22
INFLVA 61 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06
REGRESSORS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
 
 
Table 8
LTA STDLTA CVLTA STDNPL INDPRVA INFLVA
LTA 1.000
STDLTA 0.948 1.000
CVLTA 0.696 0.888 1.000
STDNPL 0.150 0.398 0.700 1.000
INDPRVA -0.620 -0.676 -0.637 -0.415 1.000
INFLVA -0.777 -0.728 -0.526 -0.208 0.757 1.000
Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 per cent level.
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
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Explanatory 
variables Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev. Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev.
intercept 0.1028 0.1099 0.0868 0.0953
INDPRVA -0.0395 0.0187 ** - -
INFLVA - - -1.2254 0.4394 ***
LEAD(STDNPL) 0.0311 0.0101 *** 0.0334 0.0090 ***
INFL -0.0230 0.0312 -0.0264 0.0323
INDPRODC -0.0132 0.0085 -0.0126 0.0083
SHAREC -0.0014 0.0008 * -0.0010 0.0007
Nr. Obs.
F-test *** ***
Table 9
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSION OF CV(LTA)
Uncertainty on industrial 
production
F(5,54)=12.39
60
Uncertainty on inflation
60
F(5,54)=16.40
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. The estimated regressions are:
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INDPRVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INFLVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
Notes: Newey-West robust standard errors are reported; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated
up to 4 lags. LEAD(STDNPL) instrumented with LAG(STDNPL).  
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Explanatory 
variables Coeffic. SE Sign. lev. Coeffic. SE Sign. lev.
intercept 0.3180 0.0272 *** 0.3473 0.0267 ***
INDPRVA -0.1080 0.0180 *** - -
INFLVA - - -3.6291 0.4449 ***
LEAD(STDNPL) 0.0150 0.0016 *** 0.0148 0.0015 ***
INFL -0.0377 0.0418 -0.0566 0.0357
INDPRODC -0.0194 0.0092 * -0.0167 0.0088 *
SHAREC -0.0009 0.0013 0.0005 0.0012
Nr. Obs.
Wald-test *** ***
R-squared (overall)
Hausman-test
Table 10
 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE PANEL REGRESSION OF CV(LTA)(1)
Uncertainty on industrial production Uncertainty on inflation
Chi2(5)=0.01
300
Chi2(5)=255.06
0.437
Chi2(5)=0.01
300
Chi2(5)=294.35
0.477
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. The estimated regressions are: 
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INDPRVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+a+u
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INFLVA+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+a+u
Notes: (1) Random effect model.  LEAD(STDNPL) instrumented with LAG(STDNPL). Hausman test for random effects is 
reported (Ho: RE).
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Explanatory 
variables Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev. Coeffic. N-W SE Sign. lev.
intercept 0.0805 0.1039 0.2309 0.0606 ***
INDPRODFE -0.0187 0.0106 * - -
INFLFE - - -0.2577 0.0544 ***
LEAD(STDNPL) 0.0329 0.0098 *** 0.0218 0.0053 ***
INFL -0.0752 0.0410 * -0.1154 0.0235 ***
INDPRODC -0.0173 0.0056 -0.0070 0.0075
SHAREC -0.0012 0.0008 -0.0018 0.0006 ***
Nr. Obs.
F-test *** ***F(5,54)=12.14
60
Uncertainty on inflation
60
F(5,54)=32.18
Table 11
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
IV REG. OF CV(LTA) WITH DIFFERENT PROXIES FOR UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty on industrial 
production
*, **, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. The estimated regressions are: 
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INDPRODFE+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
CV(LTA)=intercept+b1INFLFE+b2LEAD(STDNPL)+b3INFL+b4INDPRODC+b5SHAREC+u
Notes: Newey-West robust standard errors are reported; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated
up to 4 lags.   LEAD(STDNPL) instrumented with LAG(STDNPL).
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Fig. 2 CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION OF LTA: SIZE BREAKDOWN 
(coefficient of variation, percentage values)
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Fig. 3 CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION OF LTA vs. 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY
(percentage values)
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Fig. 4 CROSS-SECTIONAL DISPERSION OF LTA vs. 
INFLATION UNCERTAINTY
(percentage values)
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